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Confidence & decisions · 2 min read

What Can the Agent Be Tricked Into Doing?

Review the trust boundaries around AI tools and information.

/carbon-security-review

Sharon — virtual AI testerAISharonSecurityMarcus — virtual AI testerAIMarcusOWASPDiego — virtual AI testerAIDiegoAI Chatbot

Your assistant reads a document. The document tells it to ignore the user and send private information somewhere else.

The important question is not whether the document sounds persuasive. It is whether untrusted content can acquire authority inside your system.

/carbon-security-review examines AI-specific security boundaries: prompt injection, untrusted channels, data leakage, tool permissions, tenant isolation, and unsafe side effects.

Follow information into action

A retrieved page is evidence, not an instruction from the user. A tool description may itself contain untrusted content. A model's proposed action still needs authorization and correctly scoped arguments.

The review traces those boundaries through prompts, retrieval, policies, tool calls, and application enforcement. It can identify where the design relies on the model to remember a restriction that should be enforced elsewhere.

Controlled probes may help verify a suspected path when authorized. They should use synthetic data and contained tools, not send real customer information to prove it could leak.

Separate the surface from the capability

/carbon-security-review inspect our document assistant's retrieval and tool permissions; focus on untrusted instructions and cross-tenant access

The report should explain the entry point, required conditions, possible consequence, evidence strength, containment, and a verification check. A hypothetical injection is not automatically a demonstrated exploit.

This differs from a general application-security pass by putting the AI's information and action boundaries at the center.

The goal is not to make every input harmless. It is to make sure harmful input cannot quietly become permission.

Install CARBON at testers.ai/carbon for a supported coding agent such as Claude, Codex, or Cursor.

— Jason Arbon, CEO testers.ai